Historicising representations of ‘failed states’: beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?

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ABSTRACT This article examines the rise of various representations of post-colonial states to highlight how thinking and practice that arose and prevailed during the Cold War still persists in the present ostensibly post-cold war era. After initially outlining the historical construction of the social sciences, it is shown how the annexation of the social sciences evolved in the early post-World War II and cold-war era as an adjunct of the world hegemonic pretensions of the USA. A critique is then developed of various representations of post-colonial states that arose in the making of the ‘Third World’ during the cold-war annexation of the social sciences. Yet such practices still persist in the present, as evidenced by more contemporary representations of post-colonial states commonly revolving around elements of deficiency or failure, eg ‘quasi-states’, ‘weak states’, ‘failed states’ or ‘rogue states’. A more historicised consideration of post-colonial statehood, that recasts conceptions of state–civil society antagonisms in terms of an appreciation of political economy and critical security concerns, offers an alternative to these representations of ‘failed states’. By historicising various representations of ‘failed states’ it becomes possible to open up critical ways of thinking about the political economy of security and to consider alternative futures in world order.

‘We believe’, the US Secretary of State Colin Powell recently declared, ‘that it is our responsibility to have a missile defence shield to protect the United States and our friends and allies from rogue states’.1 ‘Unlike the Cold War’, President George W Bush told students at the US National Defense University, ‘today’s most urgent threat stems from … a small number of missiles in the hands of these states, states for whom terror and blackmail are a way of life’.2 Within the new US administration it seems that assumptions about ‘rogue states’ have, once again, come to the fore of US defence policy planning. It will be argued in this article that the notion of ‘rogue states’ is merely the latest in a series of representations of post-colonial states that have arisen in and beyond the context of the Cold War, namely, ‘weak’, ‘quasi’, ‘collapsed’ and ‘failed’ states. This is not to suggest that such representations all refer to the same set of characteristics. Nor is

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it to suggest that they could be used interchangeably. The notion of a ‘failed’ state, for instance, is used to describe the internal characteristics of a state, whereas ‘rogue’ states are labelled as such because of their foreign policy behaviours. What such labels have in common, however, is that they are all representations of post-colonial states; representations that enable certain policies which serve the economic, political and security interests of those who employ them.

Our aim here is to consider the wider rise of various representations of post-colonial states across the social sciences to highlight how thinking and practice, rooted in cold-war dynamics, still persist in the present ostensibly post-cold war era. The evolution of the annexation of the social sciences during the Cold War will be shown. This resulted not only in the consolidation of a particular relationship between scholarship and policy making but also in a disciplinary division of labour that has remained to date. It will be argued that this disciplinary division of labour has led to a lack of communication between politics and economics in general and Security Studies and International Political Economy in particular, thereby resulting in the poverty of our understanding of post-colonial statehood. Hence the ascendance of literature on ‘failed’ or ‘rogue’ states that focuses on the policy behaviour of such states, and the security implications of such behaviour for the liberal international economic order, without inquiring into the socio-economic conjuncture in which such behaviour evolves. By thus historicising various representations of post-colonial states it is possible to highlight processes of knowledge production and policy making and the relationship between the two both in and beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences. This enables us to illustrate the continuation and adaptation of cold-war power structures, which have sought new content and outlets, while seeking to open up critical ways of thinking about the political economy of security in global times. Thinking critically about the political economy of security provides an opportunity to move beyond certain representations of post-colonial states. One avenue, it is argued, along which debate can therefore proceed is by attempting to establish more critical dialogue in the academy between International Political Economy and Security Studies.

The argument is structured into three main sections. First, an outline is provided of the historical construction of the social sciences and how particular 19th century institutional and disciplinary structures emerged to crystallise the role of the academy in the production of knowledge. It is then argued that the social scientific disciplinary division of labour—based on a liberal idiom of methodological individualism, the formulation of universal laws, and certain notions of rationality and development—was further solidified in the twentieth century. In particular, the rise and encouragement of disciplinary generalists and area studies specialists to analyse the so-called ‘Third World’ is highlighted and contextualised within the global security considerations and practices of the USA. Here, linkages will be traced between academic research and the wider social role of universities and US national security agencies and corporations to highlight how certain practices were instrumental in the cold-war annexation of the social sciences. A result of such practices, it will be argued, was the prevalence of particular ways of thinking about, acting upon and (re)presenting
post-colonial states which, in turn, facilitated certain policies while marginalising others. The second section will then argue that this legacy of the cold-war annexation of the social sciences still persists in the present. This persistence is especially evident in the way post-colonial states are still represented across the social sciences: hence the need for a critique of more contemporary representations of post-colonial states that commonly revolve around an element of deficiency or failure in the character of ‘quasi-states’, ‘weak states’, ‘collapsed states’, ‘failed states’ or ‘rogue states’ in the study of the ‘Third World’. A third section therefore calls for an alternative approach to understanding post-colonial states as ‘failed states’. This entails developing a more historicised understanding of state formation as well as recasting conceptions of state–civil society antagonisms in terms of an appreciation of political economy and wider global security concerns. An historicised approach cognisant of the linkages between the dimensions of political economy and security relevant to the needs and interests of post-colonial states, it is argued, helps to reflect upon continuities and changes in and beyond the Cold War. As the conclusion indicates, a critical opportunity is also thrown open to question the underlying role of the social sciences and to consider alternative futures in world order.

The historical construction and cold-war annexation of the social sciences

The underpinnings of the disciplinary division of the social sciences crystallised in the first half of the 19th century and became further consolidated and formally institutionalised in the forms recognised today within the academy in the early twentieth century in the UK, France, Germany, Italy and the USA. Social inquiry was therefore institutionalised and separated into discrete disciplines during this period.

The intellectual history of the nineteenth century is marked above all by [the] disciplinarisation and professionalisation of knowledge, that is to say, by the creation of permanent institutional structures designed both to produce new knowledge and to reproduce the producers of knowledge.3

This institutionalisation of the social sciences within the university system led to the emergence of a quartet of disciplines centred around political science, economics, sociology and history. Such a division reflected the triumph of liberal ideology, created the separation of state-market-civil society, and transformed politics and social change into a search for rationality.4

By stripping away the adjective ‘political’, economists could argue that economic behaviour was the reflection of a universal individualist psychology rather than of socially constructed institutions, an argument which could then be used to assert the naturalness of laissez-faire principles.5

The focus of the (nomothetic) social sciences during this period was principally the Western world tied to the political boundaries of sovereign territories. Hence, in this instance, ‘social science was very much a creature, if not a creation, of the states, taking their boundaries as crucial social containers’.6 This ‘embedded statism’ in the social sciences is therefore linked to the sociopolitical context of
the 19th century in the aftermath of the French Revolution, within which the study of social change became the focus, while ‘space was left as merely a platform upon which events unfolded or processes operated’. Over the years the spatial framework thus created has shaped both the production of social scientific knowledge as well as its subject of study. In Peter Taylor’s words:

The state-centric nature of social science faithfully reflected the power containers that dominated the social world it was studying. Its failure to problematise this spatial structure can be explained by the naturalisation of nation-state territories.

Yet such thinking and practice did not end with the formal phasing out of the age of imperialism. On the contrary, structures have been maintained, reinforced and extended, including the apportionment of social scientific labour that has ensured the separation of the political, the economic and the social within supposedly autonomous realms. These legacies and presumptions of the 19th century, and earlier, still have a strong hold on present day mentalities to the extent that one authority has called for ‘unthinking’—rather than simply rethinking—existing social science structures of knowledge.

As noted above, social science was a ‘creature’ of states, helping to also serve their policy purposes. This is no more evident than in the study of the non-Western world, where scholarship was intrinsically tied to the age of imperialism. For the study of the non-Western world, which was organised through the disciplines of anthropology and Oriental and African Studies, gave an intellectual backing to Western domination over these lands. Edward Said’s *Orientalism* is an exceptional account of the workings of the unequal relationship between the Western colonial powers and peoples of the ‘Middle East’ during the 19th and 20th centuries and of how this manifested itself in the production of knowledge about this part of the world, which, in turn, helped keep the distance and further reinforce inequalities between the two.

The study of lands far away was funded either by governments or private entrepreneurs who had business relations with these lands. For instance, the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) was founded in 1917 for the study of Asian and African languages in order to meet the needs of an expanding empire. Until then, ‘Oriental Studies’ was offered in the universities of London, Oxford and Cambridge, among others, but these programmes mainly focused on the study of ancient texts rather than contemporary languages, the knowledge of which was becoming increasingly necessary to maintain British presence in the East. Similarly, it was within this earlier era of imperialism that the history of drought confronting Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Pacific was consciously made into famine by the policy decisions and assumptions of colonial powers, foreshadowing the constitution of the ‘Third World’.

The constitution of the ‘Third World’ also gathered pace after World War II, when social science structures of knowledge were further shaped in the shadow of the Cold War. In this period the social sciences experienced subsequent modification notably as a result of rising US interest in the discourses and practices of development. Until the 1940s the study of foreign cultures and societies in the USA had remained an intellectual enterprise pursued largely by ‘amateur enthusiasts’. What Taylor termed the ‘state-centric trilogy of
sociology, economics and politics science’ had until then focused on the Western industrialised world, thus rendering the non-industrialised world the ‘no man’s land of the social sciences’. During World War II the US Army had set up a school of languages to meet the needs of the war effort. A lack of area experts to inform policy was noticed during the 1940s as ‘the War and the Armed Forces reawakened students to study geography and to learn about the “funny people” of the world’. Hence the creation of the ‘first great centre of area studies at the US Office of Strategic Services’, which was the forerunner of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Social Science Research Council (SSRC) then later adopted the framework created for the Army schools when founding area studies in the USA. When in 1949 President Truman announced his Point IV Program on the provision of aid to ‘underdeveloped countries’, US social scientists took the opportunity to contribute to the production of knowledge about the non-industrialised world. In the 1950s half a dozen area studies associations were created with the help of government funding.

During this period, then, the division of social scientific labour in the USA increasingly revolved around the encouragement of specialist research into area studies, which resulted in the emergence of a hierarchy between area studies specialists and disciplinary generalists. Furthermore, the former also became instrumental in initiating the emergence of the three worlds schema and a focus on states within the crude classification of ‘Third World’ studies. Although the consequences of the initial rise of area studies may have been ‘unintended’, such social enquiry was increasingly deployed as an adjunct to the world hegemonic pretensions of the USA during the Cold War. The emerging discourse of development and modernisation, linked to the objectivist and empiricist ‘stages of economic growth’ theories, proposed by figures such as Walt Rostow, brought into existence a further set of relationships pivotal to the constitution of the ‘Third World’. With the perceived urgency of the necessities of the Cold War calling for the production of knowledge about the non-industrialised world, US social scientists considered themselves ‘pressed into action’. Hence the 1950s proliferation of development theories and models. The fact that area studies was still at its early stages at the time did not constitute a major problem for US social scientists for,

these were social sciences, they claimed to be producing universal social knowledge based upon the search for general laws of social behaviour. This nomothetic universalism allowed theories and models developed in and devised for the ‘First World’ to be applied confidently in the ‘Third World’. During the early Cold War era, development and area studies programmes became increasingly initiated by US state security agencies establishing crucial linkages between policy making and academic research within ‘the development industry’.

These linkages instituted a certain relationship between scholarship and policy making centred around discourses of development and modernisation that was to have a lasting legacy on the ‘making’ of the ‘Third World’. As Arturo Escobar has argued, ‘although the discourse has gone through a series of structural changes, the architecture of the discursive formation laid down in the period 1945–1955 has remained unchanged, allowing the discourse to adapt to
new conditions’. The historical role of political development theorists, as avatars of global capitalism, was crucial in this sense in subsequently engendering a ‘doctrine for political development’, based on containing demands for mass participation as a prelude to the dissemination of liberal democracy throughout the post-colonial world. Several concrete projects were pivotal in initially forging the relationship between policy making and the social sciences during this period.

In particular, a State Department-funded initiative known as ‘Project Troy’ provided much of the impetus for the early cold-war annexation of the social sciences. Project Troy, launched under the auspices of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) between 1950–51, was initially set up to expand research into methods of psychological warfare but soon shaped the wider creation of private research centres and university institutes to serve government interests. The resulting report declared it desirable that:

as much research as possible be allocated by contract to private research centres and universities in order that a wide array of talent outside of the Government may be brought to bear on the critical problems of political warfare.

In 1952 the present-day MIT Centre for International Studies (CENIS) was then created with funding from the Ford Foundation and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to fulfil the precise function of institutionalising security arrangements within the academic community. The impact of CENIS should not be underestimated. According to Irene Gendzier it was part of a broader movement in the 1960s that was preoccupied with behavioural research consisting of ‘compliant scholars and research analysts [who] accumulated information on Third World development and dissent in the interests of US foreign policy, including for a number of counter-insurgency and destabilisation programmes’.

One such programme was ‘Project Camelot’, launched in 1963 as a major Department of Defense-sponsored plan to involve behavioural experts in predicting and controlling the social and psychological preconditions of revolution and development in the ‘Third World’. The project was funded through the Special Operations Research Organisation (Soro)—a campus-based contract research organisation serving the Department of Defense—with a focus on Latin America. It was described by its director, Theodore Vallance, as ‘an objective, non-normative study concerned with what is or might be and not with what ought to be’. Although the source of funding behind Project Camelot was leaked by Johan Galtung, leading to the ostensible abandonment of the project and its US$4–6 million budget, the practice of deploying the theories of behavioural science to pursue the cold-war effort continued. For example, Soro, the sponsoring organisation of Project Camelot, reconstituted itself as the Centre for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) in 1966, hence continuing the provision of detailed information about the ‘Third World’ to the US security services. ‘The name change’, according to Ellen Herman, ‘was virtually the only change.’ Funds disseminated by the US government, the Ford Foundation and the CIA thus ‘helped to shape postwar area studies and important collaborative research in modernisation studies and comparative politics that were later mediated through well-known Social Science Research Council projects’.
While individuals such as Walt Rostow were members of research centres like CENIS there was a wider social function performed by modernisation theory and its teleological understanding of the transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘advanced’ societies. At one level, modernisation theory and the various attempts to apply it to ‘Third World’ contexts could be viewed as reflections of the ‘Sinatra Doctrine’:

Do it my way, what is good for General Motors is good for the country, and what is good for the United States is good for the world, and especially for those who wish to ‘develop like we did’.

At another level, these attempts could be viewed as having been designed to produce knowledge that would enable the maintenance of political control over societies that threatened the institutional capacities of ‘Third World’ states. During this period, there was growing insistence on the importance of strong state capabilities within post-colonial states to mould societal agents and establish political order. Daniel Lerner’s *The Passing of Traditional Society* (1958)—research that was partly sponsored by MIT’s CENIS—conveyed selective representations and typologies of Middle East states as ‘extremist’. Further, Lucian Pye, described as another ‘prolific member of the MIT CENIS team’, was not only central to research on counter-insurgency and the role of the military in modernisation and political development, but also participated in promoting the burgeoning focus on ‘political culture’ as policy-orientated support for US concerns in the ‘Third World’. Thus the political development literature, exemplified by the *Studies in Political Development Series*—funded by the Ford Foundation and the SSRC—came to represent state-of-the-art reflections on safeguarding elite power and maintaining quiescent political subjects within post-colonial states. Possibly *primus inter pares* was *Political Culture and Political Development* (1965), edited by Lucian Pye and Sydney Verba, which was also accompanied by key parallel texts such as Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba’s *The Civic Culture* (1963).

Overall, such works focused on state capabilities to maintain political order in a way that counterpoised state political institutions and societal forces: ‘successful’ post-colonial states established effective control over societal forces, while ‘weak’ states were those confronted by recalcitrant societal forces. As the Cold War waxed and waned, the linkages between government and area studies in the USA remained.

The importance of area studies in upholding US strategic interests was strongly stated by President Carter’s commission on Foreign Languages and International Studies, and even more so by the subsequent National Commission on Foreign Languages and Area Studies, established in 1980. More recently, there have been the well publicised reports of the CIA funding for research and for a 1985 conference on Islamic fundamentalism at Harvard University; and an expansion of the Defence Intelligence Agency’s Defence Academic Research Support Programme.

In this sense, these processes of knowledge construction have constituted attempts to create and maintain dominant–subordinate relations of inequality that are by no means limited to the cold-war era. What is distinctive about the cold-
war annexation of the social sciences is that it was generally rooted in cold-war fears and policies while having particularly significant manifestations in the USA.

The cold-war annexation of the social sciences and the various representations of post-colonial states that arose in this period have, indeed, had a lasting legacy. For example, the quintessential formulation of post-colonial state–society interaction—Huntington’s *Political Order and Changing Societies* (1968)—has been described as ‘a text which appears to have had an enduring impact upon the way in which scholars in the field [of ‘Third World’ studies] have thought about the state–society relationship’. Indeed, commenting on this lasting legacy, Gendzier has argued that:

> In spite of the end of the Cold War, the logic driving development policies in the 1990s remain[ed] the extension of corporate liberalism, while the arguments used to justify it … serve[d] much the same function of legitimation that they did in the 1960s.

The extension of this logic beyond the Cold War annexation of the social sciences is now examined, with attention centring on particular representations of ‘strong’, ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ post-colonial states.

**Beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences?**

The persistence of counterpoising state and society in the representation of post-colonial states, stemming from a period during which cold-war policy makers fostered a particular relationship within the US social sciences, has been aptly described as the ‘Huntingtonian formula’. It is an insistence on the necessity of strong post-colonial states moulding societal agents within this approach, in order to establish stability and political control, that has influenced the politics of development and the promotion of democratisation throughout the 1980s and 1990s. It is a formula that has been widely disseminated in representations of post-colonial states.

The understanding of the post-colonial state in Joel Migdal’s *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World* (1988) particularly reflects the tenets of the aforementioned formula. The capabilities of strong and weak states are distinguished according to ‘their unmistakable strengths in penetrating societies and their surprising weaknesses in effecting goal-oriented social changes’. In this formulation, the state is defined in a neo-Weberian ‘ideal-type’ manner as:

> an organisation composed of numerous agencies led and coordinated by the state’s leadership (executive authority) that has ability or authority to make and implement the binding rules for all people as well as the parameters of rule making for other social organisations in a given territory, using force if necessary to have its way.

Concomitantly, society is perceived as a mélange of social organisations that struggle against the state, sometimes displacing or harnessing the state, to establish who has the right and ability to guide social behaviour. The result, later also developed as part of a ‘state-in-society’ perspective, is the juxtaposition
of state and society, which are placed in a hierarchical order according to the level of stability, social control and development attained by superior state capabilities. The professed aim of this approach is to avoid state-centrism by appreciating the mutuality of state–society interactions. There is also the intention of disaggregating, or ‘studying down’, the post-colonial state, meaning the appreciation of policy making beyond an elite coterie to include more diverse arenas of policy contestation. However, there are several limitations to this conceptualisation of state–society interaction and its view of state strength (‘success’) or state weakness (‘failure’).

From the start there is a tendency to compare the capabilities of the post-colonial state with the institutional capabilities of states in the West. The denial of state status is therefore one of the ‘deceptions of sovereignty’ and stems from the comparison of an institutional transplant with conditions and processes in the West that have developed over a much longer duration. Additionally, there is a reliance on a neo-Weberian understanding of the state that succumbs to pluralist assumptions about the policymaking process and oversimplified, trivialising, ‘ideal-type’ categories of political contestation. Therefore, rather than conceptually redeeming the state, there is a tendency to abstract the post-colonial state from its socio-historical context, leading to an inability to account for historically specific ideologies and practices or the social bases of state power that may constitute or sustain a social order. What therefore emerges within this theory of state power is no account of how a post-colonial state comes into being in the first place, how it is constituted or reproduced. There is also a further tendency to reify the post-colonial state by abstracting it from the international sphere.

State strength and success, or weakness and failure, is therefore simplistically reduced to an empirically observable capacity to manipulate (usually) coercive resources resulting in an anti-democratic overtone of control and subordination. Yet, to deploy Steven Lukes’ fitting distinction, it is important to go beyond the locution ‘power to’—involving a relational capacity or ability—to also consider ‘power over’—involving a structural relationship exercised through language, ideas and institutions. Instead, the overall result is that analysis of the post-colonial state ends up overlooking the historically contingent processes of state formation and more complex patterns of state–civil society relations. Following Chowdhury, then, in analyses such as that of Migdal, ‘the state, understood primarily as a set of agencies which have a monopoly of coercive authority, remains the central conceptual instrument for understanding civil society’.

Hence:

The politics of development has been seen … as the state’s ability to encroach into societal space, successfully carrying its agenda, [or] at other times as social groups’ ability to block the state’s purposes.

The legacy of the ‘Huntingtonian formula’ is clearly present.

Studies on security in the Third World have also adopted, rather unquestioningly, the categories of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states, thereby sharing the aforementioned ‘inconsistencies and conceptual uncertainties’. Similar shortcomings also underpin assumptions about post-colonial ‘collapsed states’, defined as those
confronted by ‘a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen and must be reconstituted in some form, old or new’. Likewise, the inability to strengthen domestic legitimacy and effectively institutionalise the state in sub-Saharan African has led to a distinction between ‘juridical’ statehood, capturing the fictitious pretence of statehood, and the demands of ‘empirical’ statehood, entailing the exercise of power within a given territory. Within these terms, the ‘juridical’ post-colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa is ascribed a negative form of sovereignty which is given as the main reason for political and economic underdevelopment. Once again, such binary divisions result in the denial of state status and a pejorative representation of ‘quasi-states’ within the post-colonial and, following recent arguments, colonial world. To cite Roxanne Lynn Doty:

Rather than an objective, detached intellectual endeavour, international relations scholarly discourse on North–South relations becomes imbued through and through with the imperial representations that have preceded it.

Elsewhere, representation of the post-colonial state has been framed within a straightforward ‘failed state’ supposition. One brash rendering of the ‘failed states’ approach gauges degrees of ‘stateness’ along a continuum starting with those states that meet classical Weberian criteria of statehood and ending with those that meet none of these criteria of ‘successful’ statehood. Situating states along such a continuum, Jean-Germain Gros has argued, is supposed to assist in ‘calibrating’ the conditions for successful foreign intervention. As a result, a taxonomy of ‘failed states’ has been developed, ranging from so-called ‘anarchic states’ (Somalia, Liberia), to ‘phantom’ or ‘mirage states’ (Zaïre, Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC), to ‘anaemic states’ (Haiti), to ‘captured states’ (Rwanda), or ‘aborted states’ (Angola, Mozambique). The arbitrary and discriminatory nature of such taxonomy, however, is barely recognised, not even when Gros states—with clear ethnocentrism—that: ‘Failed states tend to be the Bart Simpsons of the international community; they are permanent underachievers.’ These, at least, are some of the contemporary versions of the ‘Huntingtonian legacy’.

Further parallels are present in the extension of this logic into the realms of democratisation, which began to replace concerns for ‘development’ from the 1980s onwards. According to the liberal idiom, democracy is predicated on the separation of the political and economic spheres. Democracy applies to the political sphere, related to the civil and political rights of citizens, while in the economic sphere property rights are ensured protection through legislative and constitutional means. The risk is that this historically specific understanding of liberal democracy can become formalised and institutionalised in a universal manner, leading to widespread depoliticisation as the economic sphere is removed from political control. After all, liberal democracy is usually equated with universal freedom and capitalist prosperity as a matter of natural progression towards human emancipation. Yet under neoliberal globalisation formal democratisation has been represented as the political corollary of economic liberalisation. This has been reflected in the sequencing of aid conditionality and neoliberal structural adjustment programmes by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank in favour of democracy
Such formal democratisation has been described as the promotion of ‘polyarchy’, defined by William Robinson as, ‘a system in which a small group actually rules and mass participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully managed by competing elites’. This definition thus envisages the normative promotion and constitution of liberal democratic norms as intrinsic to the protection of dominant class interests and the displacement of emancipatory democratic demands.

Once again, this concept of ‘democracy promotion’ was initially developed in academic circles and has been closely tied to the policy making community in the USA within organisations such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the Agency for International Development (USAID) during the post-World War II era. One of the main ideologues has also again been Samuel Huntington, who has argued that ‘the maintenance of democratic politics and the reconstruction of the social order are fundamentally incompatible’, hence the support for democracy defined in institutional terms limited to the selection of leaders through electoral competition. Similarly, in a report for the Trilateral Commission, entitled The Crisis of Democracy (1975), the threat to ‘democracy’ was seen by Huntington and others as that of popular demands outstripping the capacity of governments. ‘This seminal report’, to cite Robinson, ‘was not, in fact, really about the “breakdown” of democracy; it was about the breakdown of social control.’ Hence, once again, it is possible to trace the ‘Huntingtonian formula’ from the modernisation and development theories of the 1950s and 1960s to the democratisation theories of the 1980s and 1990s, albeit with a shifting emphasis from the state as the centre of social control to advocating and supporting the construction of conformist civil societies as supposedly autonomous spaces of individual freedom and association.

Most prominently, works such as the collections Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy by Guillermo O’Donnell et al and Democracy in Developing Countries by Larry Diamond et al, view democracy through this liberal prism, with a focus on quiescent and depoliticised civil societies amenable to capitalism. Moreover, the provenance of both these key texts stemmed from links between the US academy and the State Department; they were commissioned either by the NED or by the Woodrow Wilson Center with congressional appropriations, with the intent of informing US policy makers. Hence the earlier point that the architecture of modernisation and development theory, including consequent representations of the post-colonial state, has undergone minor modifications and shifts of emphasis, adapting to new conditions and circumstances, while remaining relatively unchanged.

The assumptions of modernisation theory continue to provide theoretical guidance for, and legitimisation of, the economic dimensions of US foreign policy, and particularly the neo-liberal model and its notion that the unfettered operation of transnational capital will bring about development.

The continuing reign of this logic is apparent in post-cold war debates on security in the ‘Third World’ and the threat to international security posed by ‘weak’, ‘rogue’ and/or ‘failed’ states. Note, for example, the following analysis by Lawrence Freedman:
The prototypical conflict now is a function of a weak state. States are weak because of the fragile nature of the civil society upon which they have been built, their undeveloped institutional structures, which are often unable to contain and channel political tensions, and their problems of poverty and economic adjustment. These weaknesses can lead to breakdowns of law and order, to secessionist movements, to outright civil war. The most susceptible states combine structural weaknesses with a regime which is inherently divisive in representing only one part of the community.70

Needless to say, in analyses such as this, no reference is made to the processes through which these states have become ‘weak’ while others have gained ‘strength’. In other words, the question ‘who’s failed the “failed state”?’ is almost never asked. Yet it is an important question to ask, because all the above-cited representations imply that these failures were caused by the intrinsic characteristics of these states, without reflecting upon their colonial background and/or their peripheral position in global politico-economic structures. The broader point to make is that suppositions about ‘failed states’ betray a lack of reflection on the power–knowledge relationship or the ways in which deepening our understanding of the factors that have led some states to be represented as ‘failed’ states may also help us to take remedial action.

Labelling certain states as ‘failed’ states serves to facilitate different kinds of policies that are simplistically aimed at two different groups of states: ‘friends’ and ‘foes’. When ‘friends’ cause a threat to international security because of their ‘weakness’, the recommended policy is one of building ‘strong’ states. According to Mohammed Ayoob, for instance, the major threat that confronts security building in the Third World is presented as a lack of ‘adequate stateness’.71 The argument is that ‘Third World’ states, as opposed to states in the ‘Western’ world, are still busy with state-building. Therefore they need to be given time and space to construct, ‘credible and legitimate political apparatuses with the capacity to provide order—in many respects the foremost social value—within the territories under their judicial control’.72 This lack of ‘adequate stateness’ prevents Third World states from ‘imposing a legitimate political order at home and from participating effectively in the international system’.73

There are various crucial problems with this analysis. First, by way of taking the ‘Western’ state as a finished project, Ayoob fails to push his argument to its logical conclusion and call for a more comprehensive conception of security, cognisant of the character of the state as an ‘unfinished project’.74 After all, state building in the ‘Third World’ and elsewhere is an ongoing process, its identity in need of re-inscription, its sovereignty in need of reaffirmation by the recognition of other states and the symbolic acts of diplomacy.75 Furthermore, the problem with such an approach has less to do with ‘an exaggerated focus on the state than a lack of analysis of the state’.76 Finally, such policy recommendations almost always neglect the security concerns of those individual and collective identities that are marginalised by ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ states alike.

When the ‘weak’ state that causes a threat to international security happens to be a ‘foe’, it is invariably constructed as a ‘rogue state’ and containment becomes the recommended policy course. As the certainty of cold-war threat perceptions eroded in the wake of the collapse of the USSR, US security thinking and practice underwent a process of rethinking, as a result of which ‘rogue states’ of
the ‘Third World’ were represented as the emerging primary threats during the post-Cold War period. This is viewed by some as an attempt on the part of US policy makers to replace the threat of communist expansionism with another ‘one size fits all “nemesis”’. Although it is worth noting that ‘rogue states’ were not constructed ex nihilo, with such conceptions flourishing as a result of anterior cold-war developments, ‘the rogue state designation reflects, specifically, the policy preferences of the United States as the post-Cold War era’s preeminent power’. This is borne out no more so than by the manner in which the spectre of devastating nuclear, chemical or biological attack has become invoked as the rationale and justification for the deployment of the National Missile Defense (NMD) system. Rogue states have seemingly become the entire raison d’être of NMD and the cornerstone of the new Bush administration’s security edifice. This is perhaps not too surprising when foreign policy is in the grip of previous cold-war managers such as Dick Cheney (Vice President), Donald Rumsfeld (Defense Secretary), Paul Wolfowitz (Deputy Defense Secretary), Richard Armitage (Deputy Secretary of State) and Condoleezza Rice (National Security Adviser). Critics such as Noam Chomsky have therefore warned that we may soon be witnessing not so much a threat from ‘rogue states’, but a threat posed by the USA as a ‘rogue superpower’, unilaterally anointing itself as enforcer of global supremacy.

It should therefore be noted that modes of thinking introduced during the Cold War remain, regardless of whether the people who use them were ‘Cold Warriors’ or not. As the latest in a host of representations of the post-colonial state, the ‘rogue state’ policy characterises not so much a departure from, or an end of, the Cold War but the prevalence of previous structures of thinking and practice seeking new outlets. What this means is recognising a more substantive meaning of the ‘Cold War’, involving the creation of institutions and mentalities that shape thought and action and entailing a set of structures that manifest themselves in the representations used to render understandings of world politics. ‘The Cold War has not ended’, argues Robert Cox, ‘it has only become more unstable. We are witnessing not a change from the Cold War but a change in the Cold War.’ It therefore becomes easier to understand why the Cold War, understood as not merely a historical period but as a mindset (or what Ken Booth refers to as the ‘Cold War of the mind’), is not over yet. The search for and creation of a new ‘other’ such as the vogue generic representation of post-colonial ‘rogue states’ best exemplifies the adaptation of Cold War institutions and mentalities to new circumstances.

What, therefore, emerges is the need for an approach that can reflect upon the processes intrinsic to the constitution of ‘rogue’ or ‘failed’ states. The aim is not so much to find ‘who’s failed the “failed state”’? but to reveal why such representations still prevail in the post-cold war era and what can be done to move beyond them in our thinking and practice. What is thus necessary is an alternative approach to representing the post-colonial state that goes beyond an ahistorical and limited conception of the state underpinning the ‘Huntingtonian formula’ and subsequent assumptions about ‘failed states’, ‘collapsed states’, ‘quasi-states’ and ‘rogue states’. The next section opens up one alternative way of examining the question of representing post-colonial states by attempting to develop an
historical method that offers an historicisation of the state, recasts the state–civil society relationship and raises questions of human security within the context of the global political economy.

**A political economy and critical security studies alternative?**

Attempts to combine an appreciation of political economy and security issues have customarily been located within the liberal democratic idiom, separating politics and economics and retaining a narrow definition of security limited to analysing challenges to state power understood in largely military terms. Even those attempts to bring the two together, such as that of Jonathan Kirshner, suffer from a rather narrow and military-focused conception of security with the aim of addressing how the issue of defence spending is a threat to security at the state as well as the global level. The referent of his analysis—what is trying to be secured—is not people or individual states, but the global liberal economic order. Elsewhere, a more differentiated consideration of statehood (and security problems inhering within different types of states) still becomes emasculated within a narrow appreciation of security issues simply revolving around ‘co-operation’ or ‘conflict’. Barry Buzan’s recent work, calling for students of security studies to join forces with students of international political economy, serves as a crucial corrective to such analyses by adopting a broad conception of security. However, although Buzan’s study demonstrates a greater appreciation of the need to treat political economy and security as interlinked realms, his analysis suffers from the limits imposed by a ‘two worlds’ approach, whereby different sets of conceptual lenses (one ‘liberal’ the other ‘realist’) are used to study security relations in different parts of the world. These two worlds—labelled as ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ by James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul—are described as follows:

In the core, economic interdependence, political democracy, and nuclear weapons lessen the security dilemma; the major powers have no pressures for expansion. The result is a relationship consistent with a liberal model of international politics. Conflicts do not disappear, but they are not resolved militarily. In the periphery, however, absolute deterrents that might induce caution do not exist. A variety of political systems, ranging from democracies to monarchies coexist side by side, and interdependence between peripheral states is subordinate to dependence on core states. Pressures for expansion are still present, stemming from goals of wealth, population and protection as well as from internal instabilities.

The practical implication of the ‘Two Worlds’ approach, which builds upon aforementioned representations of post-colonial states, is that the structural and constitutive relationships between the so-called ‘liberal’ and ‘realist’ realms of security are obscured. The only alternative left to the ‘failed’ or ‘weak’ states of the world is presented as that of becoming ‘strong’ and joining the ‘liberal’ world. Consequently there emerges a failure to question the historical processes through which the liberal ‘zone of peace’ and realist ‘zone of conflict’ emerged. The ‘two worlds’ approach, in this sense, shares with the ‘security communities’ and ‘democratic peace’ approaches a lack of appreciation of the global political economic context in which the ‘zone of peace’ emerged and continues to
flourish. For example, the emphasis placed by Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett on liberalism and democracy as the knowledge base of security communities betrays a neglect of the extent to which the Western European security community owes its existence to the absence of other security communities around the world. This point has also been raised in a recent critique of the democratic peace thesis, where the ‘mutually constitutive relationship’ between the two zones of ‘peace’ and ‘conflict’ are overlooked.

The centrality of arms exports to many Western economies effectively highlights the contradictions at work in the making of the ‘zone of peace’ and ‘zone of conflict’. What sustains such relations within the arms trade industry, despite the critical voices raised by non-governmental organisations, is the representation of some states as ‘failed states’ within ‘zones of conflict’. As a result, the inherently unequal structural relationships between the two zones are sustained. What therefore prevails in much analysis, despite attempts to focus on ‘political economy’ interactions, is a view of security that is constituted by distinct institutional realms of ‘politics’ and ‘economics’ that separately interact with one another. For example, Robert Gilpin’s standard definition of political economy refers to ‘the interaction of the state and the market as the embodiment of politics and economics in the modern world’. In addition he claims that state and market have independent logics and existences of their own, influencing the distribution of power and wealth. More recently he has also declared that ‘international politics significantly affects the nature and dynamics of the international economy’, leading to the conclusion that ‘the supportive policies of powerful states and cooperative relationships among these states constitute the necessary political foundations for a stable and unified world economy’. One consequence of these assumptions is that state and market, politics and economics, become reified (thing-like) abstractions that are separated from specific social relations and material interests that constitute a social (or world) order. By dividing politics and economics, attention is therefore diverted from security problems, which are inextricably embedded within capitalism. Hence, for Justin Rosenberg, ‘the structural specificity of state sovereignty lies in its “abstraction” from civil society—an abstraction which is constitutive of the private sphere of the market, and hence inseparable from capitalist relations of production’.

In an attempt to overcome such problems of reification, a focus on the political economy of security has recently emerged through the work of scholars within ‘Critical Security Studies’. By adopting a broad (as opposed to purely military) conception of security, these scholars seek to understand the dynamic relationship between the social–political–economic–environmental as well as military dimensions of security. This holistic approach to security is particularly fitting for the study of ‘Third World’ states for which peace and security is predicated upon the political economy of environmental sustainability and development.

Thus, by adopting a broad conception of security and, perhaps more importantly, changing its referent (whom security refers to), the aim is to provide an account of the range of threats faced by peoples across the world as opposed to merely focusing on the trials and travails of states on their way to ‘adequate statehood’. For example, Ken Booth’s approach emphasises threats that are not usually addressed by (if not caused by) state security policies.
For the most part the threats to the well-being of individuals and the interests of nations across the world derive primarily not from a neighbour’s army but from other challenges, such as economic collapse, political aggression, scarcity, over-population, ethnic rivalry, the destruction of nature, terrorism, crime and disease.\textsuperscript{94}

The difference between a Critical Security Studies approach and others that also favour the adoption of a broad security agenda is an insistence that broadening security will not suffice so long as our conception of security continues to privilege the state, regarding it as the sole legitimate focus for decision making and loyalty. This is in clear contrast to the uncritical adherents of aforementioned (neo)statist approaches in Security Studies.

Significantly, a focus on the political economy of security within Critical Security Studies encompasses an appreciation of structures within the global political economy that mediate world order.\textsuperscript{95} An understanding and appreciation of actors’ practices of security within civil society is also incorporated which goes beyond conventional tendencies to focus solely on the state’s capacity to provide security.\textsuperscript{96} Such an alternative approach, therefore, can potentially better appreciate the forces that shape the realms of political economy and security constraining and enabling post-colonial states. For merely bringing together the study of political economy and security while remaining firmly committed to statist norms to maintain economic and political stability in the liberal international political economy is not sufficient. Hence the importance of opening analysis up to the different processes of state formation and historical circumstances constitutive of various post-colonial states, thereby considering different forms of state rather than obscuring diverse trajectories of state formation.

The concept of hegemony—rather than treating politics and economics as somehow external realms in mutual interaction—offers the potential to grasp these different historical social processes and contradictions intrinsic to state formation. More specifically, the rich conception of hegemony developed by Antonio Gramsci opens up questions about how the economic realm sets certain limits conditioning possibilities in the first instance within processes of state formation, while retaining a sense of openness and contingency about subsequent political developments.\textsuperscript{97} Clearly, one has to be careful in developing this conception of hegemony in relation to different cultural conditions to avoid simply applying concepts to quite different contexts and social phenomena. After all, ‘the historicist approach to social science does not envisage any general or universally valid laws which can be explained by the development of appropriate generally applicable theories’.\textsuperscript{98} The endeavour is not to approach different historical trajectories of state development through the application of Eurocentric generalisations but, instead, to insert oneself within alternative historical and contemporary contexts in order to adopt and adapt concepts to changing circumstances and new conditions, thereby focusing on the historically specific logic of capitalist societies, while tracing similar processes of state formation. This is the purpose behind a critical theory that, ‘is conscious of its own relativity but through this consciousness can achieve a broader time perspective and become less relative’.\textsuperscript{99} Hence, at least, the possibility emerges to develop an alternative representation and understanding of the post-colonial state by drawing on this conception of hegemony to rethink issues of human security.
For Gramsci, the state was not simply understood as an institution limited to the ‘government of the functionaries’ or the ‘top political leaders and personalities with direct governmental responsibilities’. The tendency to concentrate solely on such features of the state was pejoratively termed ‘statolatry’: it entailed viewing the state as a perpetual entity limited to actions within political society. According to Gramsci, the state presents itself in a different way, beyond the political society of public figures and top leaders so that, ‘the state is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules’. This different aspect is referred to as civil society. The realms of political and civil society within modern states were inseparable so that, taken together, they combine to produce a notion of the integral state.

What we can do … is to fix two major … ‘levels’: the one that can be called ‘civil society’, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’, and that of ‘political society’ or ‘the state’. These two levels correspond on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which the dominant group exercises throughout society and on the other hand to that of ‘direct domination’ or command exercised through the state and ‘juridical’ government.

The state should be understood, then, not just as the apparatus of government operating within the ‘public’ sphere (government, political parties, military) but also as part of the ‘private’ sphere of civil society (church, media, education) through which hegemony functions. According to Gramsci, civil society, ‘operates without “sanctions” or compulsory “obligations” but nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and acting, morality etc’. There is a reconstruction of the relational nature and identity of different interests within civil society that leads to the incorporation of individuals within a collective will, thereby ‘turning necessity and coercion into “freedom”’. In these circumstances ‘one cannot speak of the power of the state but only of the camouflage of power’. Thus it can be argued that the state in this conception is understood as a social relation. The state is not unquestioningly taken as a distinct institutional category, or thing in itself, but conceived as a form of social relations through which capitalism and hegemony are expressed. At an analytical level, then, ‘the general notion of the state includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in the sense that one might say that state = political society + civil society, in other words hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)’. It is this combination of political and civil society that is referred to as the integral state through which ruling classes organise the political and cultural struggle for hegemony. It is through the state that particular social classes may establish hegemony over contending social forces. By constituting an ‘historical bloc’, which represents more than just a political alliance but indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests, hegemony may be propagated throughout society, ‘bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity … on a “universal” plane’.
if the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion … Only then can there take place an exchange of individual elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders … and led, and can the shared life be realised which alone is a social force—with the creation of the ‘historical bloc’.  

Besides these ‘normal’ conditions of hegemony, however, involving an organic relationship between rulers and ruled based on the reciprocity of force and consent, a more restrictive form of hegemony can emerge within a situation of ‘passive revolution’. Hegemony in such a situation is not based on an indirect and ‘capillary form’ of pressure transmitted through the channels of public opinion. Instead, a social group in a situation of passive revolution projects its influence through the state, which comes to replace intellectual and moral leadership. Hegemony may still prevail but in a more limited sense. For example, the demands of the popular masses may be balanced with the interests of the ruling social classes by combining the ‘matching of thrusts from below with order from above’. Alternatively, the real predominance of a social group might not be concealed, opposition forces might not be stifled through consensual means, and there might be an increase in the use of violence. Hegemony in such situations would be more degenerate, even leading to straight domination. Hence a situation of passive revolution can be characterised by shifts or variations in hegemony which may reveal the limits of a social order in organising the reciprocal balance between force and consent.

What this conception of hegemony offers is the opportunity to focus on different forms of state distinguished by ‘the characteristics of their historic[al] blocs, ie the configurations of social forces upon which state power ultimately rests. A particular configuration of social forces defines in practice the limits or parameters of state purposes, and the modus operandi of state action, defines, in other words, the raison d’état for a particular state’. In short, by considering different forms of state, it becomes possible to analyse the social basis of the state or to conceive of the historical ‘content’ of different states. The notion of historical bloc aids this endeavour by directing attention to which social forces may have been crucial in the formation of an historical bloc or particular state; what contradictions may be contained within an historical bloc upon which a form of state is founded; and what potential might exist for the formation of a rival historical bloc that may transform a particular form of state. State ‘strength’ or ‘weakness’, rather than based on state material capabilities which are separated from civil society, therefore revolves around the degree of societal incorporation and whether the formal division of economic and political power leads to the emergence of a political ruling class which obtains a relative autonomy vis-à-vis social classes in civil society. In contrast, therefore, to the conventional state-centric ‘Huntingonian formula’, a wider theory of the state emerges within this framework. Instead of underrating state power and explaining it away, attention is given to social forces and how these relate to the development of states. Considering different forms of state as the expression of particular historical blocs, and thus relations across state–civil society complexes, fulfils this objective. It also asserts the importance of an historised approach to tackling questions of state–civil society relations more attuned to historical
specificities and variations between processes of state formation in different contexts. Finally, it is possible to situate the rise of collective social forces within different forms of state as well as the wider global political economy context of world order. In this way it eschews the separation of internal ('domestic') and external ('international') realms of power within the changing boundaries of the global political economy.

It is through the recasting of state–civil society antagonisms in terms of an appreciation of political economy and security concerns that an alternative to previous representations of ‘failed states’ arises. Most notably there are striking affinities between the issues we have raised in relation to this alternative and some of the more recent subtle analyses of the post-colonial state. For example, the distinguished work of Jean-François Bayart has forsaken the ‘idea of the Third World’ for a focus on the post-colonial state in sub-Saharan Africa by examining the distinct historicity, political trajectory and social foundation of different states beyond their colonial creations. With a focus on specific historical experiences across different post-colonial states in Africa, Bayart underlines positions of power instrumental in the accumulation of wealth secured through the pursuit of hegemony. The post-colonial state is therefore conceived in relation to the social structure on which it is built, encompassing the raison d’état of a particular state, resulting in the identification of a concatenation of interests ‘straddling’ reciprocal state–civil society relations, including pervasive relationships founded within the informal economy. Various scenarios of state formation may therefore unfold as a result of the struggle over hegemony between social forces. This may involve the illusion of establishing the intellectual and moral conditions of hegemony within an ‘integral state’, which has beset, for example, the fate of Zaire (DRC). It may also include scenarios of ‘conservative modernisation’, where already established groups maintain their power (ie Nigeria, Burundi); ‘social revolution’, where the downfall of dominant groups might transpire (ie Zambia, Rwanda); ‘paroxysmic repression’, based on a recurring lack of hegemony (ie Angola, Chad, Mozambique); or, most likely, the ‘reciprocal assimilation of elites’, indicating the absorption of challenges to dominant elites through state–civil society relations (ie Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania). This does not, however, result in a static analysis of such processes but in a generative conception of the formation of state structures in relation to specific historical conditions and contemporary influences. Additionally, state–civil society relations are linked to broader patterns of production relations and processes of accumulation by situating the state in Africa within the edification of a post-colonial historical bloc characterised by conditions of ‘passive revolution’. The search for hegemony within social formations therefore unfolds within a sub-continent that is confronted with the legacy of colonisation and dependency, limited development of its productive capacity, the spectre of war, and ecological and demographic constraints.

The concept of ‘historic(al) bloc’, with its axiom that the regional asymmetry of power within society, and the involvement of this society in the world economy, constitute one and the same reality, allows one to think simultaneously of the international, national and local dimensions of the development of the post-colonial state.
This has assisted in understanding processes of democratisation in sub-Saharan Africa as the continuation of conditions of passive revolution. The liberal democratic idiom is therefore transposed by a more historicised representation of the post-colonial state, or what has been called the idiom of the ‘politics of the belly’: the predatory pursuit, or rush for the spoils, of wealth and power that, as a mode of governance, takes historically specific forms appropriate to the post-colonial state in Africa but is not simply distinctive to the pursuit of power within the region. ‘Africa’, concludes Bayart, ‘holds no monopoly in matters of the belly’. Hence corruption or criminalisation of the state in Africa is less a sign of state ‘failure’ than a mechanism of social organisation that has to be related to the specific historical experiences, cultural repertoires and political trajectories of the sub-continent through which political power is disseminated and wealth re-distributed. This also includes appreciating the strategies adopted by incumbent power holders that have been both the subjects and the objects of the multiple dynamics of dependency. The contrasts between this historicised approach to the post-colonial state and the more simplistic ‘Huntingtonian formula’—with its trail of representations pertaining to the denial of state status—or with the ‘two worlds’ approach—which compartmentalises and glosses over the mutually constitutive relationship between these two worlds—are striking.

Further, by emphasising the straddling between state–civil society relations it is possible to appreciate the role played by more informal networks within the ‘shadow state’, through which alternative modes of political authority can be exercised. Where bureaucratic state institutions atrophy, different channels of political accommodation can emerge, generating new resources, opportunities and pressures. Moving beyond a focus on the collapse of ‘weak’ institutional characteristics, where the interiors of post-colonial states are subjected to a ‘coming anarchy’, other mechanisms of social regulation can mitigate internal security threats. Hence it is possible to conceive how political authority might be rebuilt through the refashioning of patrimonial networks such as warlordism, for example in Liberia, Sierra Leone or Zaïre (DRC), where new security threats have emerged. This improves on ‘the reductionism of agentless history that characterises many accounts of weak states and state failure’. This might include clan-based forms of identity in Somalia, which find their own stability and governance at the local level. It might also include kinship, witchcraft, ethnic, or religious forms of identity that are the outcome of different rationalities and the instrumentalisation of different forms of disorder that are more attuned to maintaining social bonds that ‘work’ in Africa. In sum, an emphasis on state sovereignty emerges, not as a fixed category, but as a relational or social construct that is the product of particular practices. It is also an approach that has counterparts to understanding post-colonial state formation in the Americas and the complex mix of state building, nation making, elite power and subaltern accommodation and resistance that inheres within Latin American history. This is the benefit that can be derived from situating state–civil society relations within the specificities of particular histories and social contexts.
Conclusion: w(h)ither the social sciences?

One of the ‘sillier academic developments of the Cold War’, as Barry Buzan has argued, was the construction of security studies and international political economy as ‘separate and even opposed pursuits’. Notwithstanding recent attempts to correct this ‘wrong turn’ in the development of the social scientific division of labour, moving beyond and challenging the historical construction and cold-war annexation of the social sciences has turned out to be a seriously difficult task. Not least, there is the problem of overcoming the artificial separation of politics and economics that informs much conventional analysis related to questions of ‘political economy’ and security underpinning those representations of the post-colonial state criticised above. In contrast, a more historicised consideration of the post-colonial state recasts conceptions of state–civil society antagonisms in terms of an appreciation of the political economy of security. Our aim has not so much been to generate an alternative conception of ‘failed states’, but with presenting an alternative to the construction of ‘failed states’ as political practice. It therefore behoves us to highlight how the ‘state’ element within the notion of ‘failed states’ is neglected, sanitised and presented within a benign form of political order. Perhaps, therefore, rather than focus on ‘failed states’, increased attention should be granted to the ‘failed universalisation’ of the ‘imported state’ within the post-colonial world. By historicising various representations of ‘failed states’ it might then also be possible to move beyond the cold-war annexation of the social sciences and to begin to open up critical ways of thinking about politics and security. Primarily the latter involves considering the prospects for alternative development strategies and sociopolitical scenarios linked to wider issues of human security in order to consider alternative futures in world order. Such futures refer to ‘programmes presented for discussion, scenarios developed for clarification and setting directions for constructive political imagination and action’. The alternative critical perspective brought to bear on the representation of ‘failed states’ in this argument provokes questions about futures by highlighting the serious social science limitations and constraints of cold-war thought and action. An awareness of such structures, still persisting in the present and permeating through alternative institutions and mentalities, is therefore the starting point for thinking about possible futures.

Notes

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[20] It is significant to note here that the term ‘Third World’ was also initially used to emphasise the neglected and exploited condition of, and the revolutionary potential within, the group of non-aligned states. It was during the 1960s, when Western-originated development strategies began to show signs of ineffectiveness, that the term ‘Third World’ gained an economic emphasis and was thereafter used to refer to under-developed and developing economies. See Leslie Wolf-Phillips, ‘Why Third World?’, *Third World Quarterly*, 1 (1), 1979, pp 105–109; Peter Worsley, ‘How many Worlds?’, *Third World Quarterly*, 1 (2), 1979, pp 100–108; SD Muni, ‘The Third World: concept and controversy’, *Third World Quarterly*, 1 (3), 1979, pp 119–128; Joseph J Love, “‘Third World’: a response to Professor Worsley’, *Third World Quarterly*, 2 (2), 1980, pp 314–317.


Gendzier, ‘Play it again Sam’, p 76.


Chowdhury, ‘Neo-statism in Third World studies’, p 1094.


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William I Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalisation, US Intervention and Hegemony, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p 49. The phrase ‘polyarchy’ is, of course, developed from Robert A Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1971. See also Barry K Gillis, Joel Rocamora & Richard Wilson, (eds), Low Intensity...


Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, p 68, emphasis in the original.


Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy, pp 44, 392, n49.


BEYOND THE COLD-WAR ANNEXATION OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES?


Ibid, p 244.

Ibid, p 12.

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137 Buzan, “Change and insecurity” reconsidered’, p 15.

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