

Beyond Statism in Security Studies? Human Agency and Security in the Middle East

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The omnipresence of statist assumptions in security studies renders the role played by human agency almost invisible. The aim of this article is to contest the statist commonsense still prevalent in security studies. The argument will be made in two parts. In the first part, I will look at three studies critical of Cold War approaches to security and argue that even these approaches (that otherwise serve as crucial correctives to Cold War fallacies) privilege the state as the primary referent or agent. As a result, they end up reinforcing statism by way of foreclosing alternative non-statist conceptions of security and the constitution of alternative futures that are not built around states as the primary focus of loyalty, decision-making power and practice. In the second half of the article it will be argued that in order to move away from statism in security studies, it is not enough to contest the primacy of the state as the referent for security; there is also the need to contest the dominant agency of the state by looking at human agency and thinking up alternative (non-statist, non-military, non-violent, non-zero-sum) practices — issues peace research has busied itself with since the 1960s. Towards this end, the article will look at the roles myriad non-state actors have played as agents of peace and security in the Middle East. Here, emphasis will be on the role of the intellectual and the theory/practice relationship in security studies.

In introducing the document prepared by the International Peace Research Association (IPRA) Commission on Peace Building in the Middle East, the Project Director, Elise Boulding, stated that 'old statist solutions' were far from facing the challenge of building peace in the Middle East.¹ Underlining the inadequacy of the state's agency to meet this challenge, Boulding maintained that 'it is time for a new look at the role of people's associations, particularly the transnational ones ... [which] work in flexible ways through their own channels, while also providing key peace-making and peace-building capacities for states and for the United Nations itself'.² She laid down the task ahead for those interested in contributing to building peace and security in the Middle East as one of 'giving more attention to these largely ignored structures.

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particularly the non-governmental ones' so that the bonds of statism embedded in people's thinking as well as behaviour could be broken.³

Whilst welcoming Boulding's call for paying more attention to non-state actors as agents of peace and security, this article will argue that the statist commonsense currently prevalent in security studies (the sub-field of academic international relations that addresses issues related to war, peace, security and strategy) does not enable her call to be answered by the students of this discipline, who have, for years, produced analyses that focused on states' insecurities and practices. Indeed, the omnipresence of statist assumptions in security studies renders the efforts as well as effects of non-state actors almost invisible by way of focusing solely on the agency of the state in providing security. In the post-Cold War era, critical approaches to security have taken issue with the military-focused agendas that characterized the Cold War and called for moving beyond them.⁴ Yet, even the critics have failed to look at how human agency has contributed to security by way of voicing people's concerns, pressurizing governments to modify their policies, and mobilizing one another to take action themselves in meeting this broadened security agenda.

The point here is that although broadening the security agenda is a must in order to become able to account for multiple dimensions of insecurity faced by myriad actors in different parts of the world, putting more items on the security agenda without attempting a re-conceptualization of agency would result in falling back on the agency of the state. It will be argued that in order to avoid this and its possible ramifications (such as the militarization of threats that are non-military in character), students of security studies would need to re-think what room should be spared for human agency within a broadened security agenda. Here, the article will make a case for an alternative perspective – that of critical security studies – which aims to move away from statism by way of (1) challenging the central position that has been accorded to the state as the primary referent; and (2) calling for more emphasis on human agency in security analyses.⁵ It will be argued that in order to avoid falling back on the agency of the state, students of security studies need to look at non-state actors as agents of peace and security and critically assess their efforts.

The article falls into two parts. In the first part I will look at three prominent works that have criticized Cold War security studies for its narrow (military-focused) conception of security. Focusing on Barry Buzan's *People, States and Fear*,⁶ Mohammed Ayoob's *The Third World Security Predicament*⁷ and Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde's *Security: A Framework for Analysis*,⁸ I will argue that these otherwise critical approaches, by way of their assumptions that prioritize the state as the primary referent (to whom security refers)⁹ or agent (those who act for security),¹⁰ end up reinforcing statism in security studies.

In the second part of the article, I will look at alternative security agents that may be suitable to take up the tasks identified by Boulding. The argument in this second part is that, in order to move away from statism in security studies, it is not enough to contest the primacy of the state as the referent for security; its dominant agency should also be challenged. This, in turn, could be done by

looking at the roles played by human agency and thinking up alternative (non-statist, non-military, non-violent, non-zero-sum) practices issues peace research has busied itself with since the 1960s. Here, the role of the intellectual and the theory/practice relationship will be discussed by exploring the ways in which human agency has functioned to escape the constraints imposed by domestic and international structures. This point will be made by using illustrations from the 'Middle East', in particular the role played by Edward Said, prominent Palestinian intellectual and prolific author of several books and articles on Middle Eastern politics and the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹¹ The article will conclude by discussing the roles students of security studies could themselves play as agents of security.

BEYOND STATISM IN SECURITY STUDIES?

Statism could be defined as 'the concentration of all loyalty and decision-making power at the level of the sovereign state'.¹² Defined as such, statism is different from state-centrism. The latter could be viewed as focusing on states as referents and agents without necessarily giving primacy to their well-being. In security studies, the state has traditionally been viewed as both the primary referent ('security is about the state') and agent ('the state is about security').¹³ In the literature, this is often justified as a methodological choice made by scholars who wanted to model international relations after the natural sciences in an attempt to create a 'scientific' approach to the study of world politics. Towards this end, they sought to create a 'closed system' by identifying states as the most significant actors; assuming them to be like units; and focusing on the military dimension of security.

The point is that this methodological choice has had normative implications that remain unrecognized in established ways of thinking about security. This is because the difference between statism (which is viewed as a normative disposition) and state-centrism (which is presented as a methodological choice) is often blurred. For, adopting a state-centric approach in studying security may end up reinforcing statism by way of rendering invisible other potential referents and agents of security. This point about the theory/practice relationship will be further discussed in the concluding part of the article. Suffice it to say here that according primacy to states in our analyses does not just reflect a 'reality' out there, or make the conduct of 'scientific' analyses of world politics much neater, but also helps reinforce statism in security studies by making it difficult to move away from the state as the dominant referent and agent where all loyalty and decision-making is concentrated.

Critical approaches to security have challenged the primacy accorded to the state as the primary referent for security by posing the question 'whose security are we concerned with?'.¹⁴ However, although the privileged status of the state as the primary referent has been challenged, security studies continues to accord the state a central position largely due to its status as the dominant agent for security. In other words, due to unvoiced and/or unchallenged assumptions regarding the dominant agency of the state, security studies remains statist in outlook.

A plethora of works produced in the post-Cold War era critical of Cold War security studies have argued that security should be about referents other than the state, such as individuals, social groups or global society. By putting forward the question 'whose security should we (as students of security) be concerned with?' Ken Booth directed attention to the need to 'treat people as ends and not means. States, however, should be treated as means and not ends'.¹⁵ This is because, argued Booth, '[t]he security of "the state" is not necessarily synonymous with the security of everybody living within that state, and is even less synonymous with the security of those living in other states. When the security of *some* is at the expense of the security of *others*, tension is predictable'.¹⁶ Criticizing Booth's individual-focused approach, Martin Shaw called for a 'sociologically adequate' approach to the study of security when he wrote that 'individual and collective human security do not depend overwhelmingly on the state and/or ethnic-national context. ... Security issues are faced at all levels of social life'.¹⁷ Accordingly, he underlined the need to look at social relations and the ways in which individuals, social groups, states and the global society interact and affect each other's security. Bill McSweeney concurred when he argued that security policies should not be formulated simply by aggregating individual needs, or by attributing such needs to states. In its stead, he called for a 'reflexive theory of social order' that views the analysis of security as comprising the dynamic process in which identities and interests are mutually constituted by social agents in search for security.¹⁸

On the more conservative end of this critical spectrum was Barry Buzan who argued that 'a notion of security bound to the level of individual states and military issues is inherently inadequate' and called for looking upwards to the systemic level and downwards to the individual level in order to move beyond statist Cold War conceptions of security.¹⁹ Buzan's position is a curious one, for he, whilst critical of statism in security studies, nevertheless argued for state-centred analyses thereby ending up reinforcing it. My argument here begs further clarification.

In *People, States and Fear*, Buzan presented a broader framework for studying security, a framework that covered its economic, societal, environmental, political as well as military dimensions. As regards the referent for security, Buzan maintained that:

security has many potential referent objects. These objects of security multiply not only as the membership of the society of states increases, but also as one moves down through the state to the level of individuals, and up beyond it to the level of the international system as a whole.²⁰

Buzan's study (first published in 1983) marked a crucial corrective to statist Cold War conceptions of security prevalent at the time. However, Buzan, whilst mentioning other potential referents at the sub- and supra-state levels, nevertheless made a case for focusing on states in our analyses. He built his argument in two moves. First, argued Buzan, the anarchic structure of the international system rendered the units the 'natural focus of security concerns'. Since states were the 'dominant' units, reasoned Buzan, 'national security' was

'the central issue'.²¹ Buzan's second move was to look at the state's agency ('at the end of the day security policy still has to be made by states', he wrote)²² and infer from its privileged position as a security agent that its security should be prioritized over other potential referents. 'Because policy-making is very largely an activity of states,' argued Buzan, 'there is an important political sense in which national security subsumes all of the other security considerations found at the individual and systemic levels.'²³ This argument, in turn, hints at confusion between agents and referents. I will come back to this point later. Let us now look more closely at these two moves Buzan made to build up his argument.

Buzan's first move could be criticized first, for its assumption of the international system as anarchical and second, for identifying individuals' security with citizenship and the state. This neo-realist stance has been criticized forcefully by Alexander Wendt²⁴ among others²⁵ and space does not permit for it to be dealt with here in detail. It should suffice to say that the anarchical conception of the international system derives from assumptions made by neo-realist thinkers about subjectivity and sovereignty, and the reasoning that the absence from the international arena of what makes order possible at the domestic arena (i.e., a central government) is what renders the latter anarchical.²⁶

The anarchy/order, inside/outside divides introduced by this argument are problematic for, as Keith Krause and Michael Williams have maintained, both are built upon the assumption that 'security comes from being a citizen, and insecurity from citizens of other states' and that 'threats are directed towards individuals qua citizens (that is, toward their states)'.²⁷ However, although states are there, in theory, to provide security for their citizens, there remain the practices of many states that are constant reminders of the fact that some are worse than others in fulfilling their side of the bargain. Added to this is the case of the 'gangster' states that constitute a major threat to the security of their own citizens.²⁸ Moreover, as J. Ann Tickner reminds us, the international arena is not the only realm characterized by the absence of mechanisms of order and there may be construed yet another anarchy/order divide – that of the 'boundary between a public domestic space protected, at least theoretically, by the rule of law and the private space of the family' which is not always as well protected particularly concerning the case of domestic violence.²⁹ In sum, the first move Buzan makes to justify the privileged position of the security of states is contested in both theory and practice.

Buzan's second move, that of underlining the dominant agency of the state to fortify the case for state-centred analyses of security, has been the less contested amongst the two. This is partly because states have had monopoly over the legitimate use of violence and are therefore better endowed than any other agent to provide for security. But, perhaps more significant is the fact that students of international relations have not been orientated to look at the agency of actors other than the state concerning security issues.³⁰ The prominence of the state's agency in the economic and financial sectors has for long been challenged, but it is yet to be de-throned in security matters. Hence the

prevalent focus on states as central actors in world politics, that is, state-centrism.

The point here is that a broader security agenda, such as the one propounded by Buzan, requires the analyst to look at the roles played by human agency (such as transnational corporations, grassroots movements, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and individuals) instead of restricting his/her analysis to the state's agency. This is essential not only because states, as noted above, are not always able (or willing) to fulfil their side of the bargain in providing for their citizens' security, but also because there already are agents other than states – be it social movements or intellectuals – who are striving to provide for the differing security needs of peoples (themselves and others). In other words, a broadened conception of security such as Buzan's cannot afford state-centrism or avoid neglecting the agency of non-state actors. This is necessarily because broadening the security agenda without attempting a re-conceptualization of agency would result in falling back on the agency of the state in meeting non-military threats to security (such as acute water shortages or ethnic strife).

The problem with resorting to the agency of the state in meeting such threats is that states may not be the most suitable actors to cope with them. For, there is always the danger of the militarization of otherwise non-military issues when states intervene.³¹ The state being the most qualified actor in coping with some kinds of threats does not necessarily mean that it is competent (or willing) enough to cope with all. This is especially true for threats to individuals' security (such as human rights abuses and environmental degradation).

The argument here is that the solution to this problem could not be found in leaving such non-military issues outside the security agenda (as suggested by Daniel Deudney and Jef Huysmans).³² For, issues such as access to food, water and shelter, and the right to proclaim one's identity, are all security concerns for some and would need to be addressed in one way or another if we are to move towards 'stable peace'.³³ Moreover, the above-cited examples are issues that carry the potential to be transformed into military conflicts if not put on the security agenda and addressed with the utmost urgency. Accordingly, rather than leaving some issues outside the security agenda, students of critical security studies have proposed to keep the agenda open to be able to understand the interconnections between military, economic, societal, political and environmental threats to the security of myriad referents (individuals, social groups, states, global society). To avoid the militarization of non-military issues, on the other hand, students of critical security studies have proposed to re-conceptualize agency and think up alternative (non-statist, non-military, non-violent, non-zero-sum) practices to cope with the broadened security agenda.³⁴ More concrete examples of such alternative practices will be provided in the second part of the article.

Related to Buzan's argument regarding the state's dominant agency in security matters is Mohammed Ayoob's interjection into the debate amongst the critics of Cold War security studies and his submission that in the case of 'Third World' states, what is needed is more not less state-centrism. In *The Third*

World Security Predicament. Ayoob emphasized the need for adopting an 'explicitly state-centric' definition when studying security in the 'Third World' on the grounds that the state is the provider of security.³⁷ In fairness to Ayoob, he does not neglect other potential referents for security, or its other dimensions such as the economic or environmental. He rather thinks these other dimensions and other potential referents should be taken into consideration only if they 'become acute enough to acquire political dimensions and threaten state boundaries, state institutions, or regime survival'.³⁸ This is necessarily because, argues Ayoob, the 'Third World' states, as opposed to states in the 'Western world' are still busy with state-building and therefore in need of being given the time and space to construct 'credible and legitimate political apparatuses with the capacity to provide order – in many respects, the foremost social value – within the territories under their juridical control'.³⁹

Before criticizing Ayoob's argument, it should be noted that his analysis constitutes a crucial corrective to the external-oriented Cold War conceptions of security, and a reminder of the often neglected domestic political dimension of the (in)security problem in the 'Third World'.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, the criticisms made above regarding the problematic character of Buzan's assumption about the state being the provider of security in the domestic arena are valid for Ayoob's stance as well. After all, a significant number of unruly states are located in the Third World and they often cover up their behaviour with reference to reasons of state security. Moreover, by way of adopting an uncritical understanding of the 'Western' state as a finished project, Ayoob fails to push his argument to its logical conclusion and call for a more comprehensive conception of security that is cognisant of the character of the state as an 'unfinished project'.⁴¹ After all, state-building is an ongoing process; its identity in need of re-inscription, its sovereignty in need of reaffirmation by the recognition of other states and the symbolic acts of diplomacy.⁴² Furthermore, the problem with realist-dominated international relations theory in general and security studies in particular, has had 'less to do with an exaggerated focus on the state than a lack of analysis of the state'.⁴³

It is in this sense that the distinction Buzan introduced in *People, States and Fear* between 'strong' and 'weak' states has been an important corrective to the lack of analysis of the state in security studies. Buzan wrote:

Where the state is strong, national security can be viewed primarily in terms of protecting the components of the state from outside threat and interference ... Where the state is weak, only its physical base, and sometimes not even that, may be sufficiently well defined to constitute a clear object of national security.⁴⁴

Ayoob concurred when he submitted that it was a lack of 'adequate stateness' in the Third World defined as 'a balance of coercive capacity, infrastructural power, and unconditional legitimacy' which [prevented] them from imposing a legitimate political order at home and from participating effectively in the international system'.⁴⁵ The argument that follows this distinction drawn between strong/weak states is that if only weak states of the world could

become stronger (Buzan), or the inadequate states of the Third World were given the time and space to 'grow up' to become 'adequate' states (Ayooob), the security problematic at the international as well as domestic levels could be better addressed.⁴⁴

One crucial problem with the logic of this type of argument is that it is rooted in a statist conception of security (of the type which Boulding was critical of, as noted in the introduction). Viewed through such statist lenses, the security concerns of individuals and social groups are marginalized if not rendered invisible (as will be explained in the following part of the article). Furthermore, Ayooob's argument is based on the assumption that the way to establish security at the domestic and international levels is to strengthen the infrastructure and boost the legitimacy as well as the coercive power of the state. This, in turn, is likely to have detrimental effects on the security of other potential referents at the sub-state level. This is not to suggest that the 'Third World' states, or the weak states of the world, need not strengthen their infrastructures or try and boost their legitimacy. Rather, the argument here is that a conception of security that focuses on the security of the state to the extent suggested by Ayooob may not be helpful in understanding the problem of (in)security in the Third World. As Abdul-Monem Al-Mashat has noted, a statist approach to security provides the state apparatus with strong reasons to be superior over the society.⁴⁵ His argument is worth quoting at length:

By so doing, it strengthens the psychological dependency on the state organism and confronts social powers with a real challenge to their functions and their very existence. Society's sacrifices are perceived as obligations, but the state's privileges justified as necessary to survival. Individual initiatives and creative group interactions are confronted by the limits of maneuvers laid down by the state. Alienation and emigration, particularly among professionals and scientists (the brain drain) are among the results.⁴⁶

Moreover, Ayooob's position not only neglects the security of other potential referents, but also fails to establish crucial connections between the problem of (in)security in the 'Third World' and those individuals and social groups in both worlds whose security is threatened directly or indirectly by the policies of states or trans-national corporations. After all, those states that provide security for their citizens are able to do so largely due to their privileged position in the international economic system, which further deepens the economic insecurity of some others who live in the peripheries of the world.⁴⁷ As Tickner has maintained,

Buzan's claim that strong states can successfully provide security might be challenged by marginalized groups, such as women and minorities, whose economic security is often compromised when military security takes priority ... even strong states implement dubious policies that are not always formulated democratically.⁴⁸

Although it could be argued that Buzan and Ayooob's arguments regarding the need for building 'strong states' are made within the Third World context and that testing them within that of the developed world is a futile exercise, it is worth emphasizing that criticizing these 'model states' within their original context is critical; after all, the virtue of 'strong states' is maintained by its proponents by pointing to their achievements as security providers in the developed world. Some invaluable insights into these processes are provided in Cynthia Enloe's works where she has laid bare how the United States – a strong state which is supposed to provide for its citizens' security – has built its security on the insecurities of some women at home and abroad.⁴⁰ A case in hand is institutionalized sexism that affects not only the women who live near US bases (at home and abroad) but also helps disempowering women's peace efforts.⁴¹ Following Enloe and Tickner, the argument here is that the record of strong states in the developed world does not always back Buzan and Ayooob's arguments regarding the desirability of building strong states when viewed from the perspective of individuals and social groups.

Added to this is the fact that the process of building strong states defies underestimation or being viewed with rose-tinted spectacles; for, it is a long, brutal and often violent process. In this sense, the experience of state-building in Western Europe which 'cost tremendously in death, suffering, loss of rights, and unwilling surrender of land, goods, or labor' – to quote Charles Tilly⁴² – should serve as a reminder that there is very little in the Western European state-building experience to be idealized. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that building up strong states in the 'Third World' would lead to 'stable, liberal democratic governance' as Ayooob seems to expect.⁴³ There is also the impact made by the forces of globalization and fragmentation that often mitigate against the creation of strong states.⁴⁴ As Buzan maintains:

[L]ate developers exist in an international system whose activity and structure have been set by those that developed earlier. This makes their whole position vis-à-vis their international environment radically different from that faced by the earlier developers. For late developers, the influence of the international system and other states is much more powerful in relation to their own level of development than was the case for the early developers.⁴⁵

And lastly, but perhaps most importantly, these statist approaches foreclose alternative non-statist conceptions of security at the international level thereby making it more difficult to imagine alternative futures that are not built around states as the primary focus of loyalty, decision-making power and practice. This is necessary because the attempts to achieve security via establishing strong-states at the domestic level are often detrimental to community building at the global level for it diminishes people's respect for difference.

This brings us back to the point made earlier about the continuing reign of statism in security studies. As mentioned above, statism in security studies has taken many guises. Some, such as Ayooob, are self-conscious and open about

their statist credentials. Some, such as Buzan, on the other hand, argue against statism but nevertheless end up reinforcing it. As noted above, Buzan's argument that since it is states that act for security their security should be given primacy in our analyses is a clear indication of this confusion of agents and referents and arguably is one of the central problems of critical approaches to security⁵⁵. For, by way of this rather uncritical acceptance of the state's agency as being central, the potential of human agency is at best marginalized and at worst rendered invisible. This, in turn, forecloses the doors for constituting the alternative futures which Boulding is keen to encourage within the Middle Eastern context.⁵⁶

In a recent work co-authored with Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Buzan addressed this problem of the confusion between referents and agents that obfuscated his analysis in his previous work. Pointing to the difference between adopting a 'state-centric approach' and operating in a 'state-dominated field', Buzan *et al.*⁵⁷ clarified their position as that of the latter. Consider the following quotation:

We do not say security is only about the state (although there is much truth to the argument that the state is the ideal security actor) nor that security is equally available to all – states and other social movements. Security is an area of competing actors, but it is a biased one in which the state is generally privileged as the actor historically endowed with security tasks and most adequately structured for the purpose.

To be fair, this explanation does indeed acknowledge 'the difference between a state-centric approach and a state-dominated field'.⁵⁸ For there is no denying that the state has, for long, been the agent best endowed to meet challenges to security (as it remains to be the sole agent that has the monopoly to use legitimate violence).⁵⁹ However, I still find contestable Buzan *et al.*'s argument that their analysis is not state-centric.

The point here is that since Buzan *et al.* do not look at the agency of actors other than the state when it comes to decision-making and especially taking action, it could be inferred that they assume states to be the agents of peace and security. Non-state actors do crop up in their analysis to try and force an issue onto the security agenda (such as the environmental groups lobbying for action to be taken against a pollutant factory), to defend themselves when charged for constituting a threat to security (such as the company that owns the pollutant factory) or as referents whose security is under threat (as with individuals and social groups that are affected by this pollution), but no actor other than the state is considered to have the potential to act towards actually meeting this threat. (Whereas nowadays it is often the case that environmental groups would take action themselves or try and reach out for support from international environmental groups like Greenpeace or the Friends of the Earth before trying to invoke the agency of the state that may or may not choose to step in afterwards.) Then, it is by way of looking solely at the agency of the state that Buzan *et al.* end up moving only partially away from presenting a state-centric analysis. They have clearly come a long way but have not arrived at non-statist grounds yet.

Furthermore, it could also be argued that if security studies is dominated by states, it is because security analysts have got it that way, not because there are no other potential referents and agents that challenge the state's dominance.⁶³ The argument here is that the difference between these two positions that Buzan *et al.* try to establish dissolves when the theory/practice relationship is conceived as mutually constitutive. To put it in other words, state-centric approaches to security do not simply reflect a state-dominated field, but also help constitute it.⁶⁴ I will come back to this argument towards the end of the article when discussing the roles played by intellectuals as agents of peace and security. Suffice it to say here that from a critical security studies perspective, the role of students of security is not limited to raising policy-makers and others' awareness of the impact their commonsense assumptions have on their practices. It also includes pointing to the processes through which commonsense has been produced and to reveal the power relations implicated in these processes; the purpose being that of creating space for alternative discourses and the practices of human agency.⁶⁵

In sum, the argument here is not meant to deny the salience of the roles states play in the realm of security; on the contrary, they remain significant actors with crucial roles to play.⁶⁶ Rather it is to argue that the state's dominant position as the actor best endowed to provide (certain aspects of) security does not justify privileging its security; nor does it warrant adopting a state-centred conception of security in our studies. Accordingly, Buzan *et al.*'s approach, by way of failing to recognize the important role that is already being played by human agency, ends up giving the state's agency more credit than it deserves. Put in other words, to accord primacy in our security analyses to the state does not simply reflect a 'reality' out there, but helps reinforce statism in security studies by making it harder to move away from the state as the dominant referent and agent where all loyalty and decision-making power is concentrated. Here, the role of the student of security becomes one of self-reflection as to the implications of his/her own word politics (writing and teaching) on world politics.

The problem of the limits of statism in a globalizing world need not be repeated here. Trans-national corporations and international organizations have, for a long time, challenged the privileged agency of the state in sectors of finance and trade, among others. Moreover, the other side of the globalization coin, that of increased communication between, and awareness of, peoples in different parts of the world has made it easier for individuals and social groups to organize at the local as well as at the trans-national level to act for their own or others' security.⁶⁷ Added to this is the agency of intellectuals who represent the concerns and actions of these individuals and social groups through their own writings. The practices of human agency I will now take up in the second part of the article.

HUMAN AGENCY AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Critical approaches to international relations view social movements and intellectuals as the potential agents for change in this state-dominated world.⁶⁸

This is not necessarily wishful thinking on the part of a few academics; on the contrary, practice indicates that social movements and intellectuals (who are often in a mutually interactive relationship) have, for a long time, taken certain aspects of their security into their own hands. Three examples from the Cold War era – the Nestlé boycott, the anti-apartheid campaign for South Africa and the campaign against nuclear missile deployments in Europe – are often viewed as having inspired the social movements of the post-Cold War era.⁶⁶ These are also excellent examples of how a broader conception of security needs to be coupled with a broader conception of agency in that as we (students of peace and security) move away from military-focused conceptions of security, we would need to think up alternative (non-statist, non-military, non-zero-sum) practices. Non-state actors, especially social movements and intellectuals, with their creative practices could provide the agency required to meet this broadened security agenda. As Mark Hoffman noted, social movements 'seek to promote change and transformation in the system by identifying or creating new openings, new political spaces and new understandings of what it means to act "politically"'.⁶⁷ They do this by resorting to the power of ideas, by presenting alternative practices, by challenging the constitutive principles of the existing order and laying the groundwork for constituting alternative futures.⁶⁸

In the Middle Eastern context, social movements have done crucial work in working towards alternative futures. Still, it is often the violent actions of non-state actors that make the headlines (as with Hamas and Hizbullah's bombings in Israel/Palestine). This has become more the case in post-September 11 world politics where the critical voices of non-state actors are at best viewed with suspicion and at worst blocked. In such a crisis environment where coalescing around governmental policies becomes the norm, appealing for change by pointing to and making use of human agency is often presented as treachery. Hence the need for presenting a critical assessment of the potential roles human agency could play.

Women's movements and networks, for instance, have been cooperating across borders from the beginning of the *Intifada* onwards. Women's agency is often left unnoticed, because, as Simona Sharoni has argued, the eyes of security analysts are often focused on the state as the primary security agent.⁶⁹ However, the *Intifada* was marked by Palestinian and Israeli–Jewish women's adoption of non-statist, non-military practices that questioned and challenged the boundaries of their political communities as they dared to explore new forms of political communities.⁷⁰ Such activities included organizing a conference entitled 'Give Peace a Chance – Women Speak Out' in Brussels in May 1989. The first of its kind, the conference brought together about 50 Israeli and Palestinian women from the West Bank and Gaza Strip together with PLO representatives to discuss the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. The follow-up event took place in Jerusalem in December 1989 where representatives of the Palestinian Women's Working Committees and the Israeli Women and Peace Coalition organized a women's day for peace which, Sharoni noted, 'culminated in a march of 6,000 women from West to East Jerusalem under the banner 'Women Go For Peace'.⁷¹

Aside from such events that were designed to alert public opinion to the issue as well as finding alternative ways of peace-making, women also undertook direct action to alleviate the condition of Palestinians whose predicament had been worsening since the beginning of the *Intifada*.⁷² In this process, they were aided by their Western European counterparts who provided financial, institutional and moral support. In sum, women's agency helped make the *Intifada* on the part of the Palestinian women, whilst their Israeli-Jewish counterparts helped enhance its impact by way of questioning the moral boundaries of the Israeli state.

This, however, is not to suggest that all non-state agents' practices are non-statist, non-zero-sum or non-violent -- as is the case with the aforementioned example of women's networks. For instance, there are the cases of Islamist movements such as FIS (the Islamic Salvation Front) in Algeria and Hamas in Israel/Palestine that have resorted, over the years, to violent practices as a part of their strategies that were designed to capture the state mechanism. However, although they may be construed as threats to security in the Middle East in view of their violent practices, what needs to be remembered is that both FIS and Hamas function as providers for security for some peoples in the Middle East -- those who are often neglected by their own states. For instance, FIS undertook grassroots activism in the late 1980s during the period that ran up to the 1991 elections in Algeria and set up a network of medical clinics and charitable associations serving the poorest and most crowded localities, provided housing, opened shops, created jobs and cleaned up neighbourhoods.⁷³ Similarly in Gaza, Hamas has provided free medical treatment, food, education and cash to its followers.⁷⁴ In other words, some Islamist movements do not only offer a sense of identity, but also think up alternative practices and provide tangible economic, social and moral support to their members.⁷⁵

However, the treatment women receive under the mastery of such Islamist movements (which could otherwise be construed as agents of change due to the services they provide to peoples) serve as reminders of the fact that there clearly are problems involved in an unthinking reliance on non-governmental actors as agents for peace and security or an uncritical adoption of their agendas.⁷⁶ The role of intellectuals, in this sense, becomes crucial in that their role is to provide this critique. Intellectuals could (and arguably should) serve as guides for social movements to lead them to defy traditional forms of resistance that are based on exclusionist identities, that solely aim to capture state power or that adopt zero-sum practices.

The roles intellectuals play may take many forms, ranging from teaching and writing, thereby helping open up space for social movements, to getting personally involved in political action.⁷⁷ Although intellectuals, in criticizing power, may choose to anchor themselves in social movements, the role of the intellectual as an agent for peace and security could also be that of adopting a 'critical distance', a role that does not necessarily involve connection with a movement, or a people. Although the two positions (of adopting a critical distance and getting personally involved in political action) need not necessarily be mutually exclusive, intellectuals often choose to anchor

themselves by trying to be open and self-conscious about the other, alternative versions of 'reality', by reflecting upon their role as intellectuals and the effects of their own work on the subject of the research.

The 1980s peace movements, for instance, are good examples of intellectuals getting involved with social movements in bringing about change – in this case, the end of the Cold War.⁷⁶ The case of the 1989 revolutions is also illustrative of how the relationship between intellectuals and social movements could help us move beyond statist, military, zero-sum practices of security. The relationship between intellectuals and social movements in Europe was a reciprocal one in that the intellectuals encouraged and led whilst drawing strength from the social movements.⁷⁹

To choose an example from the Middle Eastern context, Edward Said, the well-known scholar of English and comparative literature and champion of the Palestinian cause, has also stressed this reciprocal relationship between the intellectual and social movements.⁸⁰ Said views the role of the intellectual as one of representing the ideas and experiences of 'the poor, the disadvantaged, the voiceless, the unrepresented, the powerless'.⁸¹ To fulfil this role, argues Said, the intellectual should be connected with a movement, a people, where he/she is 'responsible to and responsible *for* certain things'⁸² – as he has done with the Palestinian cause.⁸³ Looking at the role Said himself has played as an intellectual within the Palestinian struggle is as informative as his many writings on the role of the intellectual as agent. This is what I will turn to now.

Edward Said was born in Palestine and grew up in the Arab world. A professor of English and comparative literature in the United States, Said's engagement with the Palestinian struggle evolved gradually.⁸⁴ He served as a member of the Palestine National Council (PNC) between 1977 and 1991, and played a direct role in Palestinian political and diplomatic initiatives in the 1970s and 1980s. In 1991 he resigned from the PNC due to personal health reasons as well as his disillusionment with the PLO leadership's policies during and following the Gulf Crisis (1990–91).

Said has had an undeniable impact as a public intellectual on the public political discourse in the United States. His main struggle in the US domestic political arena has been against the mainstream discourses fed by the media and certain parts of the academic community, that anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian disposition which in turn feeds into US foreign policy. His practices of – what he terms – 'speaking truth to power' have included public lectures, appearances on television, lectures to college audiences and opinion pieces in newspapers. It would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that since the 1970s, Said's voice has provided the main and at times only 'antidote' to commonsense assumptions about Israel/Palestine prevalent in the mainstream media in the United States as well as the rest of the world.⁸⁵

In addition to 'representing, embodying, and articulating' the Palestinian side of the story to US audiences, Said also assumed the job of educating the Palestinian and Arab audiences on a broad range of issues including US foreign policy mechanisms, the domestic context in which US policies are made, and the representations of the Arab–Israeli conflict. For example, he helped

organize a series of seminars on US foreign policy aimed at Palestinian intellectuals, students and policy-makers. More recently, he has been contributing articles to newspapers published in the Arab world. These articles have been aimed at informing and educating Arab audiences who, according to Said, remain, after all these years, ill-informed about the functioning of US politics and society and know very little about how to get their voices heard to counter the mainstream discourses in the United States.⁸⁶

Over the years, then, Edward Said's agency as an intellectual ranged from getting directly involved in Palestinian politics to taking a 'critical distance' to question the very leadership he served under for over a decade.⁸⁷ From 1991, and especially after the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, he became even more critical of the Palestinian leadership's failure to reap the benefits of the *Intifada*.⁸⁸ It is difficult to judge the extent to which the so-called 'second Intifada' has proven him right. Besides, that is not the point. Rather, the point here is that Said has made a significant contribution to people's understanding of the ways in which 'word politics' and 'world politics' have interacted thereby paving the way for the failure of the peace process that started in Oslo.⁸⁹

CONCLUSION

Although intellectuals may choose to connect themselves with social movements – as Said has done – they may also try and fulfil their roles as agents of peace and security by reflecting upon the impact of their work on the subject of their research. Vendulka Kubálková's⁹⁰ recent work on the role of international relations scholars in reconstructing international relations serves as a reminder of the importance of self-reflection in scholarly analysis. Kubálková, in considering the roles academics play as agents of social construction via their scholarly activities, maintains that it is often the unintended effects of the academics' activities that have more significant effects than the intended ones.⁹¹ To make her point she uses the example of the Cold War and the role of US academics in reaffirming the mainstream realist understanding of international relations. Consider the following quote:

States as social arrangements require and receive constant reminders and confirmations, constant displays of symbols and rituals reinforcing the social process called state or nation. The understanding of the world as taught in international relations courses assisted these processes.⁹²

Then, to follow on from Kubálková's argument, statist approaches to security ended up reinforcing the statism prevalent in international relations via the agency of those scholars who chose to present a state-centric picture of the world in their research and teaching. As noted above, according primacy to states in security studies does not just reflect a 'reality' out there, or make the conduct of 'scientific' analyses of world politics neater. It also helps reinforce statism in security studies. Although it may be true to a significant extent that the consequences of these scholarly activities are largely 'unintended', there nevertheless needs to be a sense of self-reflection on the part of scholars as to

the fact that their theories do not leave the world untouched. In other words, scholars need to reflect upon the potential consequences of their research and teaching – to the extent that they can be aware of them.⁹³ This article has tried to point to one among many; the normative consequence (the continuing reign of statism) of a methodological choice (choosing to present state-centric analyses) made by students of security in an attempt to build a scientific discipline of international relations.

If we are to go back to the argument made above about the role of the intellectual as a security agent, and the mutually constitutive relationship between theory and practice, students of peace and security could (and should) function as agents by reflecting upon the practical implications and the constitutive role of their own theorizing. Critical approaches that show an awareness of the socially constructed character of 'reality' need not stop short of reflecting upon the constitutive relationship between theory and practice when they themselves are theorizing about security.⁹⁴ If students of peace and security wish to take this broadened security agenda seriously and take up the task Boulding identified for building peace and security in the 'Middle East', they should move away from producing state-centric analyses that promise no other than more of the past.

NOTES

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1. Elise Boulding (ed.), *Building Peace in the Middle East: Challenges for States and Civil Society* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1994), p. 2.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
4. Barry Buzan, *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the post-Cold War Era*, second edn. (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991); Mohammed Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995); Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
5. For the emerging literature on critical security studies, see Ken Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, No. 17 (1991), pp. 313–26; Ken Booth, 'Security and Self: Reflections of a Fallen Realist' in Keith Krause and Michael Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997), pp. 83–119; Ken Booth, *Security, Community and Emancipation* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, forthcoming); Ken Booth and Peter Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity: The Case of Southern Africa' in Keith Krause and Michael Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997), pp. 329–58; Richard Wyn Jones, "'Message in a Bottle'?: Theory and Praxis in Critical Security Studies', *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 16, No. 3 (1995), pp. 299–319; Richard Wyn Jones, "'Travel Without Maps": Thinking About Security After the Cold War' in Jane Davis (ed.), *Security Issues in the post-Cold War World* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 196–218; Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Keith Krause and Michael Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases* (London: UCL Press, 1997); Pinar Bilgin, Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, 'Security Studies: The Next Stage?', *Nação e Defesa*, No. 58 (1998), pp. 129–57.
6. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*.

7. Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*.
8. Buzan et al., *Security*.
9. Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*; Mohammed Ayoob, 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective' in Keith Krause and Michael Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies*, pp. 121-46.
10. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*; Buzan et al., *Security*.
11. Rashid I. Khalidi, 'Edward W. Said and the American Public Sphere: Speaking Truth to Power', *Boundary 2*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1998), pp. 161-77.
12. Ken Booth, 'Cold Wars of the Mind' in Ken Booth (ed.), *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 52.
13. Buzan et al., *Security*, p. 37.
14. Booth, 'Security and Emancipation'; Booth and Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity'; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, 'From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies' in Keith Krause and Michael Williams (eds.), *Critical Security Studies*, pp. 33-59.
15. Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', p. 319.
16. Ken Booth, 'A Security Regime in Southern Africa: Theoretical Considerations', *South African Perspectives*, No. 30 (1994).
17. Martin Shaw, *Global Society and International Relations: Sociological Concepts and Political Perspectives* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1994), p. 110.
18. Bill McSweeney, *Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
19. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 6.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', *International Organization*, Vol. 46, No. 2 (1992), pp. 391-425.
25. J. Ann Tickner, *Gender in International Relations: Perspectives on Achieving Global Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Wyn Jones, 'Travel Without Maps'; Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security'.
26. Krause and Williams, 'From Strategy to Security', p. 41.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
28. Nicholas J. Wheeler, 'Guardian Angel or Global Gangster: The Ethical Claims of International Society Revisited', *Political Studies*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (1996), pp. 123-36.
29. Tickner, *Gender in International Relations*, p. 57.
30. Scott Turner, 'Global Civil Society, Anarchy and Governance: Assessing an Emerging Paradigm', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1998), pp. 25-42.
31. Daniel Deudney, 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 3 (1990), pp. 461-76; Jef Huysmans, 'Migrants as a Security Problem: Dangers of Securitized Societal Issues' in Robert Miles and Dietrich Thranhardt (eds.), *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion* (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 53-78.
32. Deudney, 'The Case Against Linking Environmental Degradation and National Security'; Huysmans, 'Migrants as a Security Problem'.
33. Defined as achieving peace through creating trusting relationships that disarm people's minds as well as institutions. See, Kenneth Boulding, *Stable Peace* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1978).
34. Booth and Vale, 'Critical Security Studies and Regional Insecurity'; Richard Wyn Jones, *Security, Strategy and Critical Theory* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999); Pinar Bilgin, 'Security Studies: Theory/Practice', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1999), pp. 31-42.
35. Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
37. Ayoob, 'Defining Security', p. 131.
38. Abdul-Monem M. Al-Mashat, *National Security in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985); Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon, 'Legitimacy, Integration and Policy Capacity: "Software" Side of Third World National Security' in Edward E. Azar and Chung-in Moon (eds.), *National Security in the Third World: The Management of Internal and External Threats* (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1998), pp. 77-101; Yezid Sayigh, 'Confronting the 1990s: Security in the Developing Countries', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 251 (1990); Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen and Paul Noble (eds.), *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

39. Richard Devetak. 'Incomplete States: Theories and Practices of Statecraft' in John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater (eds.), *Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International Relations* (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 19–39.
40. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992); David Campbell, *Politics Without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics, and the Narratives of the Gulf War* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1993).
41. Georg Sørensen. 'Individual Security and National Security: The State Remains the Principal Problem', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (1996), p. 371.
42. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 100–101.
43. Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, p.4.
44. Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*. Also see Barry Buzan, 'Is International Security Possible?' in Ken Booth (ed.), *New Thinking on Strategy and International Security* (London: Harper Collins, 1991), pp. 31–55.
45. Al-Mashat, *National Security in the Third World*.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 33–4.
47. Here I adopt Robert Cox's conception of the periphery, which is a social rather than a geographical division. Robert W. Cox, *Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
48. J. Ann Tickner, 'Re-visioning Security' in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), *International Relations Theory Today* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1995), p. 186.
49. Cynthia Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990); Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).
50. Enloe, *Bananas, Beaches and Bases*; Enloe, *The Morning After*; Simona Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli–Palestinian Accord: Feminist Approaches to International Politics' in Deniz Kandiyoti (ed.), *Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), pp. 107–26.
51. Cited in Sørensen, 'Individual Security and National Security', p. 376.
52. Ayoob, 'Defining Security: A Subaltern Realist Perspective', p. 135.
53. Sørensen, 'Individual Security and National Security', p. 376.
54. Barry Buzan, 'Security, the State, the "New World Order", and Beyond', in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 194.
55. Bilgin, Booth and Wyn Jones, 'Security Studies'.
56. A major problem here is that not all consider change as desirable – especially not those pro-status quo regimes in the Middle East. Furthermore, given the pressure for change introduced by the process of globalization, even not-so-conservative governments regions are finding it difficult to manage the multiple and at times clashing demands of external versus domestic actors.
57. Buzan *et al.*, *Security*, p. 37.
58. *Ibid.*
59. It should nevertheless be noted that states are increasingly less able to provide for their security on their own, that is, without the aid of other states (whether through the formation of collective security organizations or military alliances).
60. Some such non-state actors that do not make it into security analyses are nevertheless recognized by the Nobel Peace Prize Committee. The recipients in the 1990s have included the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (1995), International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and Jody Williams (1997) and Medecins Sans Frontieres (1999).
61. Bilgin, 'Security Studies'.
62. Bilgin, 'Theory/Practice in Critical Approaches to Security: An Opening for Dialogue?', *International Politics* Vol. 38, No. 2 (2001), pp. 273–81.
63. What roles states might assume in meeting a broader security agenda, however, is an empirical question and would need to be answered in reference to case studies rather than being stated in the abstract.
64. Pearl-Alice Marsh, 'Grassroots Statecraft and Citizens' Challenges to U.S. National Security Policy' in Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.), *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), pp. 130–35.
65. Mark Hoffman, 'Agency, Identity and Intervention' in Mark Hoffman and Ian Forbes (eds.), *Political Theory, International Relations and the Ethics of Intervention* (London: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 194–211; R.B.J. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of Contemporary Political Practice' in R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlowitz (eds.), *Contending Sovereignities: Redefining Political Community* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1990), pp. 159–85; Wyn Jones, 'Message in a Bottle'.
66. George A. Lopez, Jackie G. Smith and Ron Pagnucco, 'The Global Tide' in George A. Lopez

- and Nancy J. Myers (eds.), *Peace and Security: The Next Generation* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 230–31; also see Marsh, 'Grassroots Statecraft'.
67. Hoffman, 'Agency, Identity and Intervention', p. 204.
 68. Walker, 'Sovereignty, Identity, Community', p. 182; Wilham Chaloupka, 'Immodest Modesty: Antinuclear Discourse, Lifestyle Politics, and Intervention Strategies', *International Studies Quarterly*, No. 34 (1990), pp. 341–51.
 69. Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli–Palestinian Accord'.
 70. Simona Sharoni, *Gender and the Israeli–Palestinian Conflict: The Politics of Women's Resistance* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1995); Hanan Mikhail-Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace* (New York: Touchstone and Simon & Schuster, 1995).
 71. Sharoni, 'Gender and the Israeli–Palestinian Accord', p. 107.
 72. Mikhail-Ashrawi, *This Side of Peace*.
 73. John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, second edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 162–83.
 74. *Ibid.*, pp. 23, 100.
 75. It is not only Islamist movements that cause problems. There is also the case of Western European non-governmental organizations in the Middle East. For a discussion, see Ghassan Salamé, 'Torn Between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean: Europe and the Middle East in the Post-Cold War Era', *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (1994) pp. 226–49.
 76. This is not meant to underestimate the devastation caused by the violent practices that result in the death of innocent civilians.
 77. Wyn Jones, 'Message in a Bottle'.
 78. Johan Galtung, 'Europe 1989: The Role of Peace Research and the Peace Movement' in Ralph Sunney and Micheal E. Salla (eds.), *Why the Cold War Ended: A Range of Interpretations* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), pp. 91–105; Kaldor, 'The Revolutions of 1989'.
 79. Kaldor, 'The Revolutions of 1989'.
 80. The best known of his writings on the role of the intellectual is the collection of the BBC Reith Lectures Said gave in 1993 entitled *Representations of the Intellectual*. Edward W. Said, *Representations of the Intellectual – The 1993 Reith Lectures* (London: Vintage, 1994).
 81. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
 82. Edward W. Said, *The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969–1994* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1994), p. 316.
 83. It should be noted that Said does not view the two positions mentioned above to be mutually exclusive. Edward W. Said, 'American Intellectuals and Middle East Politics' in Bruce Robins (ed.), *Intellectuals: Aesthetics, Politics and Academics* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), p. 146.
 84. Edward W. Said, 'Between Worlds: Edward Said Makes Sense of His Life', *London Review of Books* (May 7, 1998), pp. 5–7.
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 86. Edward W. Said, *Peace and its Discontents: Gaz-Jericho 1993–1995* (London: Vintage, 1995), p. xxiii.
 87. Said, 'American Intellectuals and Middle East Politics', pp. 146–8.
 88. Said, *Peace and its Discontents*.
 89. Pinar Bilgin, 'The Middle East Peace Process in Wor(l)d Politics', *Arab Studies Journal*, Vol. VIII, No. 2, (2000/01), pp. 196–201.
 90. Vendulka Kubáľková, 'Reconstructing the Discipline: Scholars as Agents', in Vendulka Kubáľková, Nicholas Onuf and Paul Kowert (eds.), *International Relations in a Constructed World* (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1998), pp. 193–201.
 91. *Ibid.*, p. 195.
 92. *Ibid.*, p. 196.
 93. On theoretical reflexivity ('theoretical reflection on the process of theorizing itself') see Mark A. Neufeld, *The Restructuring of International Relations Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 40.
 94. Lee-Anne Broadhead, 'Beyond the Traditions: Casting a Critical Light on Peace Research' in Lee-Anne Broadhead (ed.), *Issues in Peace Research, 1997–98: Theory and Practice* (Bradford: Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, 1997), pp. 1–18.

